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The Case for a Joint Medical Command
Capt. Arthur M. Smith, MC, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired), Capt. David A. Lane,
MC, U.S. Navy, and Vice Adm. James A. Zimble, MC, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In response to a broad set of complex national security challenges of thetwenty-first century, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report of Febru-
ary 2006 advised that all the organizations, processes, and practices within the
Department of Defense be given a high degree of agility, flexibility, responsive-
ness, and ultimately effectiveness in supporting the joint war fighter and future
national defense goals. In that connection, the 2006 QDR recommends that
medical support be likewise aligned with emerging joint force employment con-
cepts. Indeed, the Department of Defense, in conjunction with the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had already been directed to develop an implementa-
tion plan for such a unified structure, the Joint Medical Command. An anteced-
ent clause in the Department of Defense Program Budget Decision 753 of 23
December 2004 laid the conceptual groundwork. It
directed that a plan for a Joint Medical Command be
accomplished by the fiscal year 2008–2013 Program/
Budget Review. How can this intention be best
brought to fruition?
The organizational structure of the present mili-
tary hospital system predates World War II, when each
service provided for all of its own health care.1 In the
sixty years since the conclusion of that conflict, there
have been numerous proposals for a unified medical
command structure. Largely due to cost-containment
pressure exercised by the executive branch, Congress,
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and the services themselves, some cooperation has evolved in the delivery of
peacetime health care to eligible Department of Defense beneficiaries in a
framework known as the Military Health System (MHS). During this time no
less than fifteen federally sponsored studies and numerous scholarly reports
have examined the MHS, and the overwhelming majority has proposed the cre-
ation of a unified medical command.
One of the more recent recommendations is found in section 726 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, mandating a study of not only the
expansion of joint medical operations but an assessment of the merits and feasibil-
ity of establishing a joint com-
mand. It calls for an examination of
the potential for creating a joint
medical command endowed with
comprehensive budgeting author-
ity, a joint training curriculum, and a unified chain of command. This inquiry
would further identify areas of military medicine in which joint collaborative func-
tions might be facilitated, including organization, training, patient care, hospital
management, and budgeting. The act appropriately held that in order to provide the
existing combatant commands with health-services support across the operational
spectrum, a new, separately resourced, and functional medical or health-services
command should be created, on a level with the current unified and specified com-
mands. On another level, however, it remains to be seen whether the services them-
selves will finally take into account medical support requirements that are
realistically necessary to meet operational demands of the twenty-first century, and
the means by which these can be implemented in an effective and harmonious fash-
ion. Indeed, however much lip service is given to the concept of cooperation, their
separate budgets mean substantial competition. Still, a command structure that en-
hances teamwork rather than conflict would help, even if budget development re-
mains primarily a service responsibility. True team planning, as well as the
articulation of requirements and their priorities, would result if emanating from a
joint or unified command. However, there will be no changes in the posture of the
Department of Defense (DoD) toward medical support until this critical element of
flesh-and-blood personnel support is recognized and appropriately represented as
an essential element of “putting ordnance on target.” This is further exemplified by
the traditional line-leadership modus operandi of consistently deploying the “med-
ics” too far behind the “shooters.” Too many Time Phased Force Deployment Lists*
have been corrupted by lowering the planned priority of medics in the deployment
queue. Lack of a day-to-day presence in the highest circles of the Joint Chiefs is a
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The Military Health System requires an orga-
nizational overhaul. A radical restructuring is
necessary.
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handicap. A joint medical commander on equal footing with the other joint com-
mands, unified and specified, would more effectively address these many
challenges.
THE MISSION OF THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE
The MHS currently includes organizations tailored to distinct but related tasks:
maintaining deployable personnel as well as medically unique units for imple-
menting the “readiness mission”; managing medical treatment facilities (hospi-
tals and clinics); and facilitating managed-care support contracts—the “benefit
mission.” In essence, the military health system has concurrent responsibilities for
maintaining readiness of health care personnel to provide medical support to
military operations and likewise providing a comprehensive health benefit to at
least nine million beneficiaries, including active-duty personnel, retirees, survi-
vors, and their dependents. In support of these responsibilities, the Defense De-
partment operates one of the largest and most complex health care
organizations in the nation. Including overseas facilities, the three services oper-
ate about seventy hospitals and over eight hundred clinics (411 medical and 417
dental). The benefit and readiness missions are inextricably linked by the fact
that the same medical personnel are used for both.
The Military Health System is funded through a single, consolidated appro-
priation, the Defense Health Program. Since the creation of the program in
1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD/HA) has been
the program manager for all fiscal resources used to provide medical care in gar-
rison.2 Over the years, the assistant secretary has been given enhanced authority
for resource management and contracting, the latter executed through the
TRICARE Management Activity. In contrast, authorizations and funding for
military personnel, including those in the medical services, are resourced by
Congress directly to the services. The services also receive direct appropriations
to pay for health services delivered in operational settings, including training,
exercises, and humanitarian assistance, etc., as well as war. These resources flow
through the service chiefs to both line and deployable medical units via the op-
erational chains of command.
To represent the “stakeholders” perspective in the Defense Health Program, a
Defense Medical Oversight Committee was created in 1999. It was used to pro-
vide top-level oversight and efficiency that were previously lacking. That com-
mittee has now been superseded by two groups: the Senior Military Medical
Advisory Council, with membership including, among others, the ASD/HA and
the surgeons general; and the Military Health System Executive Review Com-
mittee, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Resources.
The latter’s membership comprises the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and
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Reserve Affairs of each of the three services; the vice chiefs of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force; the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; the DoD comp-
troller; the ASD/HA; the director of the Joint Staff; and the director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation. The surgeons general and the other agency representa-
tives are ex officio members.
These efforts may have enhanced interservice cooperation, but they have by
no means created “jointness” among the medical departments. Indeed, the tra-
dition of independence, even competitiveness, between the services remains the
biggest obstacle to developing a joint approach among the medical departments,
even for the peacetime benefit mission.
MILITARY MEDICINE: DUAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND
COMPETING IMPERATIVES
The requirements for maintaining qualified personnel who have skills and
knowledge relevant both in garrison hospital settings and in support of military
operations make medical readiness unique from other military disciplines. The
development and maintenance of these distinct skills call for training and expe-
rience in military medical treatment facilities (MTFs) as well as within deploy-
able units. Although the two missions complement one another in some ways,
joint pursuit of both readiness and benefits involves a complicated set of
trade-offs and management challenges. A large standing force is required to at-
tain and maintain medical readiness, particularly during wartime; accordingly,
many active-duty personnel—physicians, nurses, and other health care person-
nel—must be employed in regular patient care during peacetime in order to
keep their clinical knowledge and skills current. Service at MTFs, where health
care for most beneficiaries is provided, thereby contributes to readiness, by
keeping active-duty personnel at peak clinical performance. Likewise, caring for
the families of mobilized personnel constitutes an employer health benefit to
military personnel and their family members during active service, as well as af-
ter retirement.
However, the military readiness mission involves deploying these same medi-
cal personnel (and necessary equipment) to support military forces throughout
the world in wartime, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, and during
military training. To do so requires ongoing training not only in specific medical
specialties needed for wartime but in military skills as well. Furthermore, some
medical skills have only military applications, such as aspects of undersea and
flight medicine, or facility with stabilizing combat casualties under austere con-
ditions for rapid evacuation through an echeloned system.
Manning and training requirements drafted by the services envision continu-
ous staffing of deployable medical units at levels sufficient for maintenance of
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equipment, as well as military and medical-specific unit training in combat con-
ditions. They call for personnel qualified to support medical readiness across the
spectrum of military activity—personnel with medical training, clinical experi-
ence, military training, and operational experience. Consequently, some active-
duty health care personnel must regularly leave the MTFs to join deploying
medical units. Experience in operational units is also important for learning to
communicate with supported units and earning their trust and respect. Such re-
lationships point to an important cultural component for maintaining readi-
ness. Likewise, medical personnel must become accustomed to the constraints
of operational environments and understand their medical ramifications while
maintaining proficiency.
From all these mandates, the operative reality of competing imperatives
arises. The two missions draw upon overlapping resources. The readiness mis-
sion must be balanced against the demands of the benefits mission. But if per-
sonnel are to practice medicine in operational contexts, often in austere
conditions, under high stress, and with limited resources, they must train with
operational units. Unfortunately, over the last fifty years the costs of providing
peacetime health care for eligible beneficiaries have consumed an increasing
proportion of military health service resources. Today, the MHS not only gives
priority to the benefit role but focuses heavily upon reduction of beneficiary
health care costs—when in fact those costs should be accepted as part of the
price of being medically prepared for going to war.
COORDINATING PEACETIME HEALTH CARE WITH THE
OPERATIONAL MISSION
A key consideration when restructuring the MHS of the future, then, will be a
firm commitment to optimizing the coordination required to execute both mis-
sions effectively. Allocation of personnel between the two constitutes a challenge
for the MHS, and it would be a major responsibility of any new joint or unified
health services command.
The Present Status
The medical readiness mission is unique, and few lessons from the civilian sec-
tor are applicable. Among its requirements is the ability to coordinate the many
and varied elements of DoD. The Military Health System’s current diffuse man-
agement structure appears to lack this ability. For example, although a medical
treatment facility can control the readiness activities of its personnel, such as in-
dividual skills training, many objectives (for instance, materiel maintenance and
unit training) can be met only within deployable medical units. Furthermore,
these operational units are often under nonmedical commanders, with no direct
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medical chain of command. In these cases medical unit leaders are evaluated by
line or support commanders, who might not appreciate or understand the com-
peting issues they face.
The Need for Coordination
Presently, the services’ medical departments have no centralized command and
control, though their missions are essentially the same. This lack of unified com-
mand produces inefficiencies in manpower, resources, coordination, planning,
and innovation. The services’ semi-independent systems arguably cooperate to
the greatest extent possible, under an organizational structure that makes them
competitors for the same readiness and peacetime-benefit missions. This loose
organization lends itself to inefficiency and poor resource management within
such a large, complex health care organization. Furthermore, within each of the
unified combatant commands (e.g., U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Com-
mand, etc.) joint forces surgeons, although ostensibly responsible for coordina-
tion and integration of medical support among the services, have neither
command authority nor staff empowered to synchronize and integrate truly
what they are given by the individual services.3
Greater interoperability and interdependence could result from reducing re-
dundancies, conserving resources, and initiating collaboration. A desirable de-
gree of coordination is most likely to emerge from a unified structure with
clearly defined lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability, supported
by both appropriate and timely information, performance evaluation, and suit-
able incentives. What is needed is an unambiguous assignment of responsibility,
adequate resources, and authority to ensure readiness, as well as mechanisms for
coordinating all this with peacetime health care, given the duality of the military
medical mission.
Searching for Precedents
Any new joint health-service entity must be capable of supporting military op-
erations, whether they are single-service, joint, or combined. Consequently, a
key driver of organizational structure must be the provision for institutional
and situational coordination dedicated to readiness. Its leadership will require
the information, authority, and responsibility to allocate any resources neces-
sary for efficient readiness training of DoD medical personnel.
In the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the unified commander
has certain responsibilities and authority in special operations activities,
whether carried out within the command or not: programming and budgeting,
budget execution, acquisition of specialized assets, training, determining and
validating requirements, and monitoring the services’ personnel management
activities. A unified medical command would be similar in that it too would
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have broad continuing missions and be composed of forces from all military de-
partments; accordingly, its commander should be given similarly expanded re-
sponsibilities and authority. Specifically, all Defense Health Program funding
would be apportioned to the unified command instead of to the services. This
would ensure coordination between medical readiness and TRICARE manage-
ment, and encourage a unified approach to the readiness mission. The SOCOM
model would also give the unified medical commander oversight of the services’
management of medical personnel. The services would retain responsibility for
organizing, manning, and equipping operational medical units, while deploy-
able human assets would be assigned to the unified commander (who might
choose to keep them within their current line organizations if that is most oper-
ationally effective). Also, medical personnel and activities organic to the sup-
ported operational unit would most likely remain outside the joint purview.
Some of these functions are thoroughly integrated within nonmedical units—
for example, Marine battalion aid stations and warship sickbays.
U.S. MEDICAL COMMAND
The Commander, U.S. Medical Command, would likely advise the secretary of
defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on uniformed military medical
issues while working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
on policy. The joint U.S. Medical Command would, as implied above, be the op-
timal agency for centralizing the budget for readiness and medical activities. A
unified command of this size would be best commanded by a four-star flag or
general officer (whether from the line or medical communities would be a deter-
mination best made by Defense Department leadership). Thus, the commander
would outrank the surgeons general of the services and would also be in the best
position to consolidate health plan authority for TRICARE. This model envi-
sions dual roles for the surgeons general—as medical component commanders
reporting to the unified medical commander, and as senior medical staff officers
reporting to their respective service chiefs.
The U.S. Medical Command structure must transform the MHS into an inte-
grated team with service and TRICARE components. The task of establishing
the “wiring” for this integration will be enormous. It requires construction of a
network of command relationships to articulate budgetary requirements and
establish end strength and infrastructure size, while ensuring the requisite links
between the services and TRICARE contractors. Likewise, it must align account-
ability and authority with responsibility and resources for both these readiness
and benefit missions. The command must also effect a balance between health
care (prevention and treatment), education, and research.
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The proposed unified medical command needs to give the Military Health
System the resource efficiency and operational flexibility it requires to change
the ways in which it provides force protection in support of the combat forces
and the manner in which it does business and works with others—specifically by
relieving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs of responsibility
for the benefit mission, including integration with the TRICARE health plan.
Also, whereas line-medical relationships at the operational and tactical levels
have traditionally been mediated by service component medical commands, the
command relationship between
U.S. Medical Command and ser-
vice medical departments will en-
hance doctrinal jointness, by
centralizing command and con-
trol without sacrificing operational control by the services. It will also enhance
technical and intellectual jointness, by capitalizing on the synergies between the
benefit and readiness missions.
The arguments against a unified medical command are centered upon the
uniqueness of each service’s mission, environment, and role. Indeed, while the
benefits of combining training activities presumably include lower costs from
economies of scale and improved interoperability, the reality of service-specific
training does exist, and it must be addressed before training is combined. The
relationships between each service’s medical and line units must likewise be fos-
tered and sustained. In general, any reorganization of the health care system
must identify and give careful consideration to medical support that is unique to
a specific service or mission, while it attempts to ensure appropriate levels of
interoperability.
The appropriate assignment of units and personnel would need to be deter-
mined before a U.S. Medical Command could be established. In an ideal setting,
this would require extensive negotiation and agreement among the stake-
holders. In reality, because of the differences between the existing formal organi-
zational structures of the medical departments of the three services, this will
require a mandate by law. Once in place, the concept would create a separate
chain of command for much of the medical readiness mission under the joint
commander’s overall authority. All deployable units, other than those that re-
main organic to line commands, would report through service component com-
mands to either a deputy commander for readiness or directly to the unified
medical commander. The resources needed for readiness would be identified
and allocated to the readiness components. This would include personnel as-
signed to deployable units and, ideally, personnel assigned to medical treatment
facilities but available to the deployable units when needed.
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A U.S. Medical Command structure must
transform the MHS into an integrated team
with service and TRICARE components.
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As noted above, ASD/HA currently manages the large Defense Health Pro-
gram budget (approximately $36 billion per year) through the TRICARE Man-
agement Activity. (The Defense Medical Oversight Committee had been used to
provide some level of oversight and efficiency that was previously lacking. This
has now been superseded, also as noted previously, by both a Senior Military
Medical Advisory Council and a Military Health System Executive Review Com-
mittee.) The budget is managed by a staff and through the three military ser-
vices. The staff of the U.S. Medical Command would encompass a TRICARE
Management Activity and assume these responsibilities, including contracting
support. The U.S. Medical Command would provide the needed command and
control, maintain (no doubt) civilian contracting authority, and free the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to focus upon policy formulation
and oversight. The TRICARE Management Activity itself would be structured
within regional medical organizations to coordinate care between the MTFs and
regional contractors, and it would ultimately be responsive to the needs of the
three surgeons general, who would serve in the joint command as service com-
ponent commanders.
Responsibility for health matters at an installation, and for the health of all
assigned military personnel, would continue to be the responsibility of the med-
ical treatment facility commander, as would management of MTF personnel re-
sources, which has great impact upon operational readiness. The surgeons
general would oversee medical readiness in their services, being in the best posi-
tion to see that the MTF commanders do not neglect their commitment to oper-
ational readiness in order to enhance the “productivity” of their health care
services. The surgeon general, in his or her capacity as chief medical officer for
each respective service, would monitor and retain authority over the MTFs in
maintaining the health of active-duty personnel, providing care to families, and
supporting readiness training and deployment. In essence, the surgeons general,
as component commanders, would have linkages to both the service chiefs and
to the commander of the unified medical command—the former for opera-
tional control and the latter for program development, personnel management,
and training. Having the same individual in both chains should enhance both
balance and clarity of mission.
The Military Health System requires an organizational overhaul. A radical re-
structuring is necessary, primarily to ensure sustained medical readiness but also
to improve cost management and achieve better integration of health care deliv-
ery across the component services. With a budget expected to exceed $50 billion
by 2010 and a mandate to provide care for more than nine million people, military
medicine needs a specified joint medical commander “with portfolio”—that is,
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with direct access to the highest levels of military and civilian Defense policy
making. The ultimate mission of the U.S. Medical Command would be to artic-
ulate effectively the requirements for current and future medical support of an
increasingly joint and interdependent defense establishment, and likewise to en-
sure their implementation.
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